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PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND STATE INTERVENTION
RUTH FARRUGIA'
Parents are vested with rights and duties over their children by virtue of
childbirth. The rights that vest with childbirth become somewhat more com-
plex when matters such as repudiation, acknowledgement, adoption or child-
care placement are involved. In basic terms, however, the birth of a child
gives rise to parental responsibility.
Generally, parents are assumed to have only the best interests of their
children at heart. It is taken for granted that these parents will automatically
make the right choices for their children and exercise their parental rights in
a manner that satisfies the "natural inclination and aspirations of the chil-
dren."1
In the real world, we are well aware that this is not always the case. In
fact, we realize with great sadness that there are an overwhelming number of
parents who do not exercise parental responsibility in the best interests of
their children. In such cases, does a child have any hope of a happy child-
hood within a family structure?
The State intervenes when parents fail to provide the responsible care
that is expected On paper, this looks like the obvious solution to what could
potentially be a disastrous state of affairs for the child. But then again, those
of us who have seen this intervention at work may well think otherwise. Al-
though the State intervenes with the best of intentions, in some situations it
achieves a contrary result.'
Lecturer in Family Law, University of Malta.
1. CODE CIVIL [C. crv.] ch. 16, art. 3B (Malta).
2. See Mavis Maclean, Delegalized Family Obligations, in FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY
POLICY IN THE NEW EUROPE 129 (Mavis Maclean & Jacek Kurczewski eds. 1997). Where
Mavis Maclean makes an important distinction in identifying:
'good' enough parents and those who fail to meet this criteria. The former are re-
minded of their responsibilities, which survive divorce and are independent of
marriage, and are expected to make their own decisions about their children's up-
bringing as they choose. The latter group [includes those subject] to close supervi-
sion, in partnership with their local social services welfare department.
Id. Maclean discusses the popular argument that "the cost of private quarrels should not fall
upon the public purse" which is why States do their utmost to encourage parental responsibil-
ity since this measure, "while at the same time reducing public costs, offers the government
the 'dream ticket' of doing good while saving money." Id. at 130.
3. See Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Dept. of Social Services, Report of the Inquiry
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These situations, therefore, bring forth the crux of the issues under con-
sideration. How does one determine when State intervention crosses the
boundary between representation of the best interests of the child, on the one
hand, and interference on the other? How does one ensure that the end result
is truly in the best interest of the child? How should the child's involvement
be solicited when such input is potentially invaluable to the process of de-
termining what is truly the best interest of the child? These are some of the
questions that must be resolved in the topic under discussion.
I. PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
In early law, and to a considerable extent throughout Roman history, the
pivot of the Roman familia was the paterfamilias who exercised patiriapotes-
tas over the family and other dependents." We have come a long way from
the ius vitae necisque ' and the absolute control that entitled the paterfamil-
ias to treat the child as part of his property, where his responsibilities toward
the child were largely that of maintenance and economic support.
In most countries of the world today, it is accepted that parents bear the
primary responsibility for their children.6 This means that parents are obliged
to "look after, maintain, instruct and educate"" their children, with mainte-
nance encompassing essentials such as food clothing, habitation, health and
education requirements Both parents jointly hold this responsibility.
into Child Abuse in Cleveland in 1987 (1988) (visited Jan. 24, 2001)
<http://www.hmso.gov.uk>.
4. See Tufts University, Perseus Digital Library (visited Jan. 24, 2001)
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu> [hereinafter Perseus Digital Library]. Paterfamilias translates
to "father of the family." Id. Patriapotestas translates to "the power the father has over the
members of the family." Id.
5. lus vitae necisque translates to the power of life and death and was only exercised in
exceptional circumstances. It was subject to the requirement that a concilium be convened to
hear the case and the paterfamilias was bound by the verdict that the concilium passed. See id.
6. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44125, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, 28 I.L.M.1448 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Child Convention]. Many States have accepted and ratified the Child Convention. Article
18 of the Child Convention states "both parents have common responsibilities for the up-
bringing and development of the child. Parents... have primary responsibilities for the up-
bringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic con-
cern." Id. art. 18.
7. C. crv. ch. 16, art. 3B.
8. Maltese Court judgments have been generous in defining educational and health ex-
penses in the best interest of the child. A recent case Miriam Camenzuli v. Joseph Camenzuli,
(Cit. 11/94) Court of Appeal June 26, 1997, dealt with the issue of whether the non custodial
parent should have to pay the expenses of a cosmetic operation to the remedy "path ears," to
pay for a contribution fee to the child's school where such fee was in fact part of the fees, to-
gether with expenses relating to school transport, books, uniform and shoes. The Court found
that it was in the best interest of the child for such payment to be made and so ordered the
non-custodial parent who had sole responsibility for maintenance. It also admonished sepa-
rated parents as to their responsibilities towards their children at all times, irrespective of their
relationship with their spouse.
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The problem clearly begins with the assumption of parental responsibil-
ity. Assuming that the responsibilities of parenthood are undertaken will-
ingly, the child should be able to sit back and count on unconditional love,
care and support for eighteen or so years until the attainment of the age of
majority when the time comes to "put away childish things."9 The reality,
however, is that there are parents who do not assume any responsibility
when a child is born. In Malta, the mother has no choice but to accept paren-
tal responsibility because of the old Latin assumption of mater semper creta
est si vulgo conceperit.0 In several other European countries, this rule no
longer holds the same weight" as a mother may opt for an accouchement
sous "X."' 2 In Malta, the assumption and application of the rule can be
avoided if a mother abandons her child shortly after birth so that her connec-
tion to it remains unknown; however, if maternity is later established, the
mother may be subject to criminal sanctions.
According to Maltese law, the father of the child born out of wedlock is
responsible as a parent only if he voluntarily acknowledges the child or
when a court declares his paternity. 3 The legal relationship between the fa-
ther and the child is as though the child were born in marriage. 4 This distinc-
tion between a child born within wedlock and one born outside of it has been
the subject of much heated debate. Although discrimination against illegiti-
mate children in matters of succession has been declared as unconstitu-
tional, 5 the legislature has yet to put into effect any amendments to remedy
the situation.
Unfortunately, some children are subject to parental authority exercised
by a parent or parents who have no interest in assuming such authority. Does
this imply that such a parent has a lesser obligation than the parent who vol-
untarily assumes parental responsibility?
An interesting viewpoint on this issue has been raised in a fairly recent
Scottish case, McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board, 1" where an unsuccessful
vasectomy resulted in childbirth. The Scottish court stated that although "the
law no longer upholds the sanctity of life as an absolute value," the value of
9. 1 Corinthians 13:11 (King James) ("When I was a child, I spoke as a child, I under-
stood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things.").
10. See Perseus Digital Library, supra note 4 ("The mother is always certain, if she
conceives openly."); C. civ. ch. 16, art. 95 ("The mother, even though she has not acknowl-
edged the child, shall have the same obligations and fights as the father who has acknowl-
edged the child.").
11. See generally the laws in Italy, France, and Belgium among other States.
12. Literally translated from the French this means giving birth under the name X, an
unknown title.
13. See C. civ. ch. 16, art. 92.
14. See id. art. 90(1). Barring the loss of the fight to receive legal usufruct over any
property belonging to the child which is enjoyed by the parents of the child conceived in wed-
lock. See id.
15. See Mario Buttigieg Pro et Nomine v. Attorney General and Prime Minister First
Hall, Rikors 544/96 AJM (January 17, 1997) not appealed.
16. McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board, [1997] S.L.T. 211.
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a child should be held to outweigh all of the costs associated with the child-
birth and the failed vasectomy because the law "has not reached the state
where family relationships and the worth of a child's existence are values to
which it is indifferent."' 7 It made no difference to the court that parental re-
sponsibility attached to such a birth as a compulsory matter, subject to strict
penalties.1 8
The other side of the coin lies in the obligation of the child to obey the
parents in all that is permissible at law while being subject to the authority of
these parents." Even here, the hand of the State has intervened in several
countries to ensure that children are not subjected to physical punishment by
their parents." In balance, it must also be pointed out, however, that some
States have gone to the other extreme and, pursuant to court rulings, are ad-
vocating the reintroduction of caning as a means of chastisement for way-
ward children."
The decision as to chastisement of a child, presumably in the parents'
effort to educate the child, can, therefore, be severely influenced by the
State.22 At one extreme, the parent is prohibited from using any means of
force, while at the other end of the spectrum parents who are adamantly
against corporal punishment may see their child caned by court order. All
such intervention or interference is carried out with the intention of being in
the best interests of the child.
Parental responsibility should be carried out in the best interests of the
child. Some scholars argue that two kinds of parental responsibility exist. 3
The first type of this responsibility is derived from the status of biological or
adoptive parenthood. The second type of parental responsibility is the practi-
cal aspect of parenting.2" With all due respect, it seems hard to accept this
description in view of the fact that parenthood, by necessity, imports the ex-
ercise of responsibility. It is difficult to imagine one without the other, just
as it is difficult to imagine law that is incapable of any practical effect.
Whether parents actually accept and engage in the practical aspects of their
17. Id. at 216L-17L.
18. See Elaine E. Sutherland, Scotland: From Birth to Death, in THE INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 383, 385-86 (Andrew Bainham ed. 1996).
19. See C. civ. ch. 16, art. 92.
20. See generally the laws in Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria and Cyprus, where it is
unlawful for a parent to hit a child.
21. In 1994, a Singaporean Court ordered the caning of a U.S. teenager. See Fay v. Pub-
lic Prosecutor, [1994] 2 S.L.R. 154. The judgment in Singapore generated support in several
American States for the introduction of caning for juvenile offenders. See Barbara Ehrenreich,
Caning (visited Jan. 23, 2001) <http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/june94ehren.htm>.
22. See C. clv. ch. 16, art. 154(1) (Maltese law may deprive a parent of parental author-
ity "if that parent, exceeding the bounds of reasonable chastisement, ill-treats the child, or ne-
glects his education.").
23. See John M. Eekelaar, Parental Responsibility: the State of Nature or Nature of
State?, 1991 J. Soc. WELFARE FAM. L. 37, 39 (1991).
24. See id.
4
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parental responsibilities is another issue, one that could and should lead to
the termination of their parental rights when appropriate.
Although the notion of rights over children has become distasteful over
recent years, it is still true to say that parental rights do exist. Parents still re-
tain the right to make a multitude of decisions on behalf of their children.
Parents are expected to make these decisions in a responsible manner. Fail-
ure to act responsibly, and, indeed, failure to act at all, often leads to the cur-
tailment of such rights. This termination of parental rights, however, does
not completely solve the problem. It only leaves the child in a vacuum where
someone else must take over the exercise of parental responsibility - and
who else is available other than the State?
II. STATE INTERVENTION
The State has a responsibility to intervene when parents do not live up
to the responsibilities parenthood thrusts upon them. This liability to provide
for the lack of parental care can therefore be viewed as having a subsidiary
nature. Having said this, however, it is easily apparent that the responsibility
of the State vis-ai-vis the child is at times far from subsidiary.
The State, for instance, is bound to ensure that children have access to
healthcare, education and social security. It is the State that determines the
compulsory age at which a child may terminate education, just as the State
may order compulsory vaccinations for health reasons. Should the parents
make the decision to vary from these norms, they run the risk of incurring
State imposed sanctions.
Given that the State-assumed responsibilities are sometimes not simply
subsidiary in nature, it may be fair to ask whether the parents actually wish
or expect the State to shoulder some of the responsibility in the upbringing
of their children. Although they retain the right to choose the school to
which they send their children, parents may not prevent their children from
attending school unless they are in a position to provide personalized tuition
in keeping with State established curriculum. It would hardly be acceptable
for parents to decide that employing the child in the family business consti-
tuted vocational training sufficient substitute for traditional education. The
State would go so far as to attempt to ensure that the child be given time to
learn, rest and play without being roped into child labor in the interest of
keeping costs down within the family trade.
In Malta, a current trend among a large number of parents is to send
their children to additional private lessons to better prepare them for school
advancement examinations. This trend is the subject of a heated debate. Par-
ents, caught up in the trend, place a significant burden on their children in
that a great number of these children must, after a long school day and ac-
companying homework, take additional classes with more homework, leav-
ing next to no time for recreational pursuits. Parents are becoming so ob-
sessed with their children's examination results that their children's lives
5
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centers on schooling. The trend is most prevalent when children are between
the ages of ten and eleven when entrance examinations to secondary schools
are the norm, then later at age sixteen when children attempt to enter college
to begin higher education."
In a country where education is given the highest consideration, with
sixty-six percent of secondary school children continuing with their studies
beyond the compulsory school age of sixteen and at least twenty percent
proceeding to tertiary education, 6 this attitude is hardly surprising. However,
it is not unknown for parents to send even kindergarteners to additional les-
sons for help with their numbers or their letters. Would State intervention be
justified here where the best interests of children should logically include
free time to play?
There is also the subject of health intervention. In Malta, there have
been a series of cases where children needed emergency blood transfusions;
however, the children's parents, who were of the Jehovah Witness faith, ob-
jected to the transfusions. The courts have repeatedly decided in favor of the
State Health Authorities by granting the applications and ordering the blood
transfusions. Some would argue that a court's decision to grant an applica-
tion against the parent's wishes amounts to classical State intervention. Oth-
ers, however, may consider it State interference with parental authority,
aided and abetted by the judiciary. Obviously, it is carried out in the name of
the best interests of the child.
Few of us would question the prejudicial effect of circumcision on fe-
male children, although male circumcision does not produce the same out-
cry.2" While traditional practices resulting in facial scarring have been the
subject of prosecution, ear and nose piercing is perceived to hardly warrant
attention "in a world where children are victimized in so many more harmful
ways." 9 How is the line drawn between the State intervening to protect the
child and the State standing back to allow the parent, in the exercise of pa-
rental authority, the ability to make decisions related to declarations of eth-
nicity?
There is no issue or question that a State has an obligation to address a
child's needs when the parents fail to supply primary needs such as food,
clothing and shelter, especially when the child is clearly in need of such care
and support. Indeed, it has been suggested that the State has the responsibil-
ity of being vigilant in identifying the children who are in such need, even
25. See Ministry of Family and Social Welfare Report, 97 (1996). Available from the
Department of Information of the Government of Malta <http://www.msp.magnet.mt/infol
contacts.htm>.
26. See id. at 95 (1996).
27. See Application 327/95, May 14, 1995; Application 481/96, September 23, 1996 (on
file with the author).
28. See PENELOPE LEACH ET AL., CHILDREN FIRST 204 (Alfred Knopf ed. 1994).
29. Michael Freeman, The Convention: An English Perspective, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 93, 107-108 (1996).
6
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before any request for assistance is made. As discussed below, the methods
employed in identifying children in dire need of assistance are often contro-
versial as they encompass areas where parental discretion and State interven-
tion tend to overlap.
Malta provides care, protection and control for children identified as be-
ing in need under the Children and Young Persons (Care Orders) Act. 30 Un-
der the Care Orders Act, the State may intervene when a child is
beyond the control of his parents.., or... is not receiving such care, pro-
tection and guidance as a good parent may reasonably be expected to give
and (i) the child... is falling into bad associations or is seriously exposed
to moral danger; or (ii) such lack of care, protection or guidance is likely
to cause the child ... unnecessary suffering or seriously affect his health
or proper development.31
Recognizing what constitutes a good parent and the reasonableness sur-
rounding the provision of care, protection and guidance are clearly thorny
problems that the law is only too familiar with. To date, the courts have used
the "best interest of the child test" in determining whether a parent measures
up to these criteria. In cases of doubt, the State comes down on the side of
the child, preferring to not take risks while attempting to work with the par-
ents for eventual family reunion wherever possible.3 ' As discussed below,
however, the efficacy of the machinery for setting the State investigation in
progress is entirely another matter.
The law accepts the possibility of parents making the decision to give
up their rights over their children. It is a necessary corollary that they are
also freed from all ensuing responsibility. It is hard to imagine a more far-
reaching act in a parent's life. In one fell swoop, parents may be exonerated
from any obligations towards their children, regardless of whether the child
and the State are happy about this state of affairs. Parents have the option
rarely given to other interested parties at law: they can walk away.
30. See C. civ. ch. 285.
31. Id. at ch. 285, art. 7.
32. See Child Convention, supra note 6, art. 3. The Maltese courts and administrative
authorities put forth great efforts to ensure "the best interests of the child" is a primary con-
sideration. Id. For instance, in Nathalie Mifsud v. Ministru ta' 1-Intern u l-Izvilupp Socjali,
social workers visited a family after a court clerk reported that the mother had threatened to
kill herself in the presence of one of her sons. A report revealed that Mrs. Mifsud's marriage
was characterized by violence and that she had been admitted to a mental institution on two
occasions. On a subsequent visit, social workers and a psychiatrist witnessed Mrs. Mifsud go-
ing into a rage and badly hurting her two-year old son. She confessed to hitting him during
her rages and would not give any assurance that the beating would not occur again and did not
exclude the possibility that she could even kill him in a fit of rage. A care order was issued
and family therapy was recommended. Although Mr. and Mrs. Mifsud sporadically went to
family therapy sessions, they eventually reverted back to their violent patterns of behavior.
The child was kept under the care order. See Nathalie Mifsud v. Ministru ta' 1-Intern u I-
Izvilupp Socjali, First Hall Civil Court of Malta (1991).
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Where parents choose to forego the baggage that comes with parent-
hood, there is little anyone can do about it. The State is left to pick up the
pieces and attempt to ensure that the child does not lose out too much. It can
place the child with a foster care provider in its eagerness to provide an al-
ternative family, or it can facilitate adoption proceedings so that the child
may be integrated into a new legal family unit. Failing these alternatives, the
State must provide accommodation and care for any child whose parent does
not shoulder parental responsibility. 33 The position of the State that inter-
venes for a child's protection is often complicated by the equally compelling
argument that favors respect for parental privacy. This right is enshrined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights where Article 2 states "[n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home, or
correspondence. '3 Furthermore, the European Convention on Human Rights
states that "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and correspondence" and "[t]here shall be no interference by a
public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance
with the law. '3 The concept of parental responsibility itself incorporates a
notion that parents have the right to maintain privacy in their family life. Be-
cause of this "judges frequently face an impossible decision between the
protection of children and the protection of parental autonomy."3
The courts are instrumental in protecting family members from having
their privacy rights invaded when they determine the boundaries that the
State must observe.37 Therefore, it remains at the court's discretion whether
the invasion of such privacy should be carried out when they are overwhelm-
ingly faced with detrimental repercussions for the child. Ultimately, it would
appear that State intervention and parental responsibility must look to the ju-
diciary in straining a leash set at the precise balance warranted in favor of
the best interests of the child.
III. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Elaboration of the law is usually left up to the courts, with the ensuing
wide range of interpretations, to determine what is really in the best interests
of the child and family under review. It is also an open invitation to the
33. Initiatives in Northern European countries are veering away from this concept. The
father of a child must contribute towards maintenance and the mother must identify the father
where this is possible, failing which the State will only supply a minimum of maintenance
benefit.
34. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 71 U.N., art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
35. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 8 §§ 1-2.
36. Emily Jackson, The Child Mother, in FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY POLICY IN THE NEW
EUROPE 43, 48 (Mavis Maclean & Jacek Kurczewski eds., 1997).
37. See Cossey v. U.K., App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (ser. A) (1991);
Dudgeon v U.K., App. No. 7525/76 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (1981).
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courts to look into the future and attempt to determine what the child's best
interests will be in the next few years. 8
The courts are usually left to interpret the law, while the legislature,
when enacting laws, must decide whether to provide stringent rules or in-
stead allow some means of discretionary power to be exercised via interpre-
tation.
Under Maltese adoption law, for instance, in situations where parents do
not consent to adoption but adoption is manifestly in the child's best interest,
the court can dispense with the consent requirement. 39 The court may decide
that for grave and exceptional reasons, the parent's opinion can be overrid-
den and the child can be adopted.' Although this measure is often viewed as
insufficient, courts utilize it in preference to the time consuming freeing for
adoption process.' Once children are declared free to be adopted by caring
parents who knowingly assume parental responsibility, the current situation
of children languishing in children's homes for want of their parents' con-
sent could become a thing of the past.'2
The court assumes and uses its discretionary power in other areas. In re-
cent times, the most glaring use of the court's discretion is its option to hear
the child in matters that are of interest, importance or concern to the child or
the child's future. Various legislations have set different ages as the thresh-
old for admission to such hearing. 3 Does this mean that children marginally
under this age are to be ignored?
38. See Jackson, supra note 36, at 43-55. Discussing the Birmingham City Council v. H
(A Minor) case where a 16-year old mother with behavioral problems was judged unlikely to
be able to fulfill her child's needs. See Birmingham City Council v. H (A Minor) [1994] 1 All
E.R. 12. The House of Lords sanctioned the severance of the relationship between the mother
and her child. The argument brought by Emily Jackson is that it may not be in the best inter-
ests of a 16-year old girl to be burdened with the responsibilities of motherhood, and it is
quite plausibly not in the best interests of a baby to have a mother who is an immature adoles-
cent. But to deprive a mother of any contact with her baby, and to deprive a baby of the
chance to get to know her mother, are drastic and oppressive actions. Jackson, supra note 36,
at 52.
39. See C. Civ. ch. 16, art. 117(1)(a). This is not to say that Maltese courts do not go out
of their way to ensure that all interested parties are heard or called to give consent according
to law.
40. See id.
41. Freeing for adoption is the process whereby parental rights are terminated or declared
at an end and a child is deemed free to be placed under the parental authority of alternative
parents. Usually this process flows smoothly, with one set of parents taking over from the
other immediately. In freeing for adoption, the adoption or social welfare agency may apply
for termination of parental rights itself, rather than the prospective adopters, and then place
the child. This method removes the element of risk from the prospective adopters who may be
reluctant to care for a child not yet declared "free" to be adopted.
42. Between 1992/1993 there were 434 children in residential care. See Reply to Parlia-
mentary Question 589134 (1993). This is not to say that all these children could have been
placed in adoption. There is no such breakdown of statistics. Since then, the average number
is said to have decreased to about 300 children a year.
43. Malta establishes the age at fourteen. See C. clv. ch. 16, art. 6A. Some States estab-
lish the age as young as twelve. See for instance the relevant laws of Denmark and the Neth-
9
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While it is true that children often have access and the ability to be
heard in court, what children say is not always fundamental to conclusions
reached by the court." In custody cases, while a child's views may be heard
the child's desire to reside with one parent rather than the other does not
oblige the court to decide the issue according to such wishes. The voice of
reason tells us that this is as it should be. Courts are there to weigh all evi-
dence and to reach conclusions in the best interest of the family and all fam-
ily members, wherever this is possible. The weight attached to children's
views, however, should be graded against the compromise to their happiness
and to the happiness of the home when the children are ordered to reside
with a parent that they are unhappy with.' Clearly, the dilemma centers on
the balance to be struck between these often competing factors.
IV. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE EXERCISE OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ' (Child
Convention) clearly sets out the duties incumbent on parents by virtue of pa-
rental responsibility, and the analogous duty of States to recognize these
rights. The Child Convention enumerates these duties in a number of arti-
cles.'7 Furthermore, the Child Convention lists a series of civil rights for
children in articles 12-16."8 Article 12, in particular, recognizes the child's
right to freedom of expression and participation in the judicial process. '9 It
erlands.
44. See C. civ. ch. 16, art. 6A (The court only hears the child if the child's opinion is
"deemed opportune.").
45. See David Swain, Family Group Conferences in Child Care, 9 INT'L J. OF LAW &
THE FAM. 155, 166 (1995). The article discusses family group conferences as an innovative
feature of the legal system in New Zealand where children are listened to more seriously and
their interests are given greater protection. See id.
46. See Child Convention, supra note 6.
47. See id.
[Article 14(2):] States parties shall respect the rights and duties of parents.., to
provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right [freedom of
thought, conscience and religion] in a manner consistent with the evolving capaci-
ties of the child.
[Article 18(1):] State parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the
principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and
development of the child. Parents... have the primary responsibility for the up-
bringing and development of the child. The best interest of the child will be their
basic concern.
[Article 27(2):] The parent(s) ... have the primary responsibility to secure, within
their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the
child's development.
Id. arts. 14(2), 18(1), & 27(2).
48. See id. arts. 12-16 (These rights include freedom of expression, information,
thought, conscience, religion and association.).
49. See id. art. 12. Article 12 has been used in France since 1991 and Belgium since 1992
10
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goes so far as to promote judicial participation: "the child shall in particular
be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative
proceedings affecting the child either directly, or though a representative or
an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of na-
tional law."
The Child Convention is equally clear on delineating the responsibility
of the State in recognizing the role of the parent and in establishing the assis-
tance the State should render to ensure that parental responsibilities are real-
ized. Finally, the Child Convention deals with those areas where the State
assumes responsibility for children itself. It sets out a lengthy catalogue of
responsibilities to be undertaken by the State. 2 These articles reflect the rec-
ognition by the State that the child has both general human rights and special
rights in view of the vulnerability of the child and the child's right to prefer-
ential protection.
The Child Convention can thus be seen as adopting the famous three P's
formula: Protection - the right to be protected against certain forms of behav-
ior such as abandonment, child abuse and exploitation; Provision - the right
to have access to certain benefits and services such as education, health care
by advocates who argue for child rights to participation before the courts.
50. See id.
51. See id.
[Article 3(2):] States parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care
as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties
of his or her parents ... and to this end shall take all appropriate legislative and
administrative measures.
[Article 5:] States parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of par-
ents... to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the
child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights
recognized in the present Convention.
[Article 9 (1):] States parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from
his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to
judicial review determine.... that such separation is necessary for the best inter-
ests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such as
one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one where the parents
are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child's place of resi-
dence.
[Article 18 (2):] For the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth
in the present Convention, States parties shall render appropriate assistance to par-
ents ... in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure
the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children.
[Article 27 (3):] States parties ... shall take appropriate measures to assist parents
... to implement this right [a standard of living adequate for the child's physical,
mental, spiritual, moral and social development] and shall in case of need provide
material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition,
clothing and housing.
Id. arts. 3(2), 5, 9(1), 18(2) & 27(2).
52. See id. Arts. 2(1), 3(3), 6(2), 8(1), 11(1), 12(1), 13 (1), 19(l), 20(1), 21, 24(1), 26(1),
28(1), 32(2), 34- 35, 39.
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and social security; and Participation - the right to carry out specific activi-
ties and freedom of participation in the judicial process. 3
The State undertakes and shoulders a very long list of obligations. As in
the case of parental responsibility, the situation begs the question as to what
happens when a State does not shoulder such responsibilities. When a parent
fails to provide the child with the qualities pursuant to parental duties and
obligations, that parent loses parental authority. What is the result when a
State fails to honor its own international commitment of providing the child
with those rights it has promised to protect?
As with any international document, enforcement is one of the saddest
areas under review. The Child Convention attempted to alleviate this prob-
lem by setting up an internal monitoring body in the form of the Committee
on the Rights of the Child.' The Committee has carried out some worthy in-
vestigations, but to date it has reviewed only a small fraction of the reports
received, and, it ended its eighteenth session where it only dealt with six re-
ports." Meanwhile, initial reports, dating back to 1992,56 and recently filed
second reports are awaiting review.
Where international feedback is sparse, 7 national goodwill could give
force to the Child Convention by setting up an Ombudsman for children, as
seen in the Norwegian tradition." Such a measure would ensure monitoring
of children's rights within their own territory and would also enable an inde-
pendent organization to refer a report to the Committee set up by the United
Nations or at least to assist in the compilation of the report."'
In attempting to offer a solution to the problems under review, it is im-
possible to overlook the vital importance of regional participation in the
monitoring and promoting of children's rights.
The latest development in the field of child rights is found in the Euro-
pean Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights (Children's Rights
Convention).' This international agreement was opened for signature and
53. See generally POLITICS OF CHILDHOOD AND CHILDREN AT RISK, PROVISION-
PROTECTION-PARTICIPATION (P.L. Heilio, E. Lauronen & M. Bardy eds., 1993).
54. See Child Convention, supra note 6, art. 43.
55. See U.N. CRC document CRCICI74, March 3, 1998 regarding the eighteenth session
May 18-June 1998.
56. See id.
57. See U.N. Convention, supra note 6, art. 44 (describing "the obligation to present
country reports" however, it is a well known fact that many countries have not filed their re-
port.).
58. Norway is not the only State to adopt this trend, it has been adopted by Sweden,
Costa Rica and New Zealand.
59. See Child Convention, supra note 6, art. 44(6) (obliges individual States to publish
and circulate its reports throughout their own country.). The efficacy of this article also leaves
much to be desired.
60. See Council of Europe, European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights,
Europ. T.S. No. 160, January 25, 1996, (visited August 15, 2000) <http://conventions.coe.int
/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm> [hereinafter Children's Rights Convention].
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ratification in January 1996.6" It is envisaged that by strengthening and creat-
ing the procedural rights that can be exercised by children themselves, the
Child Rights Convention could facilitate the exercise of the substantive
rights of children, particularly in family proceedings affecting the child.62
V. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
So far, throughout this article, attention has been paid to the role of the
parents, State, judiciary and supra-national contributions which aim at look-
ing after the child, providing maintenance, education and health whilst ena-
bling children to realize their abilities, natural inclinations and aspirations.63
In conclusion, what remains to be discussed is the involvement of the
children themselves in this process. To date, it appears that it is the adults
involved who attempt to dictate the actions to be taken when determining the
best interests of the child." The British House of Lords stated in Gillick v.
West Norfolk that the child is expected to be able to make up his mind
"when he reaches a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capable of
making up his own mind on the matter requiring decision."'
Recent cases, however, have shown that a court is willing to overrule a
child that is competent to make a decision under the criteria of understanding
and intelligence when the child's decision is not acceptable to the court.67
The matter becomes far worse where the child has no independent represen-
tation before the courts.
Under Maltese law, a child who is at least fourteen years old may be
heard by the court in a matter of fundamental importance to the family, if the
court finds it beneficial to permit such a hearing.68 Where the issue, however,
relates specifically to a matter of parental authority, the court, "after hearing
the parents and the child if the latter has reached the age of fourteen years,
shall make those suggestions which it deems best in the interests of the child
and the unity of the family" and may even order that one parent be author-
ized to decide the issue where it appears the particular parent is more suit-
61. See id.
62. EUGENE VERHELLEN, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN EUROPE, UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS 529 (1996).
63. See C. civ. ch. 16, art. 3B.
64. See Child Convention, supra note 6, art. 3 ("the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration," not that the child's best interests will be the primary consideration or
paramount consideration.).
65. Gillick v. West Norfolk [1985] 3 All E.R. 402.
66. Id. at *36 (Templeman, L.J., dissenting).
67. See In Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1992] 4 All E.R.
627. A case of a 16 year-old anorexic girl who tried to starve herself where the Court of Ap-
peals ruled that someone who had parental responsibility over the girl could override her deci-
sion to refuse treatment. See id.
68. See C. civ. ch. 16, art. 6A.
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able to "protect the interest of the child."" Following the Report of the
Commission to Provide for the Setting up of a Family Court, it has been
suggested that the law be amended so as to enable independent legal repre-
sentation for children, particularly in separation" and custody cases."1
In cases where couples opt for mediation, the voices of their children
may be heard. However, since there are no statistics regarding the impact of
mediation involving children, it is difficult to estimate what the potential im-
pact may be in a particular case." Indeed, in the cases where the mediation
process is attempted, children are often brought in at a later stage of the pro-
ceedings by which time decisions have already been formulated and the
meeting is merely one of review to enable the children to hear of the deci-
sion rather to play any active role in its making.
Surely one of the main goals of the Child Convention was precisely to
ensure participation of children in the making of decisions that concerns
them. The Child Rights Convention now awaits commitment from States
who agree that children have the right to a voice. Whether States will over-
come their tendency towards ventriloquism and realize that the best interests
of children require full recognition of the child as an individual remains to
be seen. What is clear is that parental responsibility and State intervention
will have to make room for a new dimension of child participation.73
69. Id. art. 131.
70. Divorce is not part of Maltese law, although recognition of a foreign divorce decree
is perfectly legal. See C. civ. ch. 16, arts. 35-66.
71. The author was a member of the Commission that presented the report in December
1997.
72. See Michael Richards, The Needs of Children at Divorce, FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY
POLICY IN THE NEW EUROPE 203, 214 (Mavis Maclean & Jacek Kurczewski eds., 1997).
73. See Child Rights Convention, supra note 6, arts. 3-5, 9-10.
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